Abstract: While the scope of 'veil lifting' has been severely restricted in UK case law, two recent notable judgments, Chandler v Cape Plc and Thompson v Renwick Group Plc, have held that a parent company could owe tortious liability for the health and safety of its subsidiary's employees. This article contends that the legal principle recognised in Chandler and Thompson could successfully prevent corporate group abuses of separate corporate personality and limited liability, when combined with 'veil lifting' and protection against misrepresentation in UK law. With reference to the theoretical justification of limited liability, there are three circumstances in which limited liability should not apply: ex ante opportunism, ex post opportunism and in relation to involuntary creditors. Most cases in the former two categories can be dealt with by applying existing UK legislation and case law concerning misrepresentation and 'veil piercing'. The final category can be dealt with by Chandler's direct tortious liability regime if it is appropriately refined. This paper proposes an integrated understanding of Caparo's three requirements for establishing a duty of care, namely foreseeability, proximity and fairness, and four-group categorisation, namely reliance on superior knowledge, confusing representation, business integration and fairness for other reasons, in which the parent's direct tortious liability should be recognised.
A. INTRODUCTION
As corporate groups have gained power in the global economy, concern has grown regarding their abuse of separate corporate personality and limited liability in order to avoid liabilities such as tax, tortious claims of personal injury, environmental damage and exploitation of workers in developing countries. The typical example of this abuse is a case in which a parent company attempts to make itself 'judgment proof', which means insulation from judicial scrutiny, allowing it to avoid liability or to prevent judgments against it from being enforced, 1 by having the subsidiaries exercise harmful business practices without giving them enough assets to compensate the damage caused by their activities. Parent companies are carefully exempted from the definition of 'shadow director' in the Companies Act 2006, 2 thereby it is unlikely that they can be liable for damage caused by their subsidiaries as a 'shadow director'. In addition, a direct contractual relationship between a parent company and its subsidiary's creditor is unlikely to be found if relevant contracts between the creditor and the * Assistant judge (Kobe District Court, Japan). BEc (Nagoya University), JD (University of Tokyo), LLM (University of Bristol, Distinction). I am very grateful to Professor Paddy Ireland for his supervision on the original version of this paper as a final dissertation at the University of Bristol.
injuries, when they accepted the offer of employment from the employer. Although
Hansmann and Kraakman briefly mention this 'voluntariness' of employees, they do not develop a detailed analysis of in what situations 'involuntariness' of employees could be found.
14 Another problem with this argument is that it does not seem to provide detailed analysis of the lack of information and ability of ordinary people, such as individual consumers, who have traditionally been thought not to be involuntary creditors, to assess the risks of dealing with a company. Due to limited disclosure requirements of private companies' information and the relatively weak bargaining power of such persons, they are usually unable to obtain sufficient information to assess the risks appropriately. If tort creditors should be protected because of the lack of opportunity to assess the risks of dealing with the company, contractual creditors who have no opportunity to assess these risks due to lack of information or ability also should be protected. Nevertheless, there have been no legal measures to achieve this outcome.
This article seeks to demonstrate that, from a company law perspective, when combined with 'veil-lifting' and protection against misrepresentation in UK law, the legal principle recognised in Chandler and Thompson could prevent most corporate group abuses of separate corporate personality and limited liability, including abuses against involuntary creditors in a broader sense, taking the lack of information and ability to assess the risks of dealing with the company into account. The legal principle of Chandler and Thompson is refined for this purpose, and an attempt at categorising the situations where direct tortious liability of parent companies could be recognised is made in order to ensure legal certainty and clarity. The article excludes issues related to tax and legislative reform to concentrate on an analysis of how practitioners should act based on the present UK law. A thorough analysis from a tort law perspective is also excluded, as that analysis is presented in articles by
Petrin 15 and Morgan. 16 After reviewing the history of UK law on separate corporate personality and limited liability in section B, section C investigates the justification for limited liability to show that there are certain situations where it is not justified. An investigation into the circumstances in and methods by which limited liability should be removed is then conducted in section D to demonstrate why Chandler's direct tortious liability regime should be preferred to other alternatives. Section E extends Chandler's regime by referring to a theoretical discussion on 14 Hansmann and Kraakman (n 4) 1920-21. 15 Petrin (n 10). 16 Morgan (n 11).
the value of limited liability shown in the previous sections, followed by the attempts in section F to categorise the situations in which direct tortious liability of parent companies could be recognised. Finally, the conclusion and the remaining issues which should be discussed further in the future are considered in section G.
B. DEVELOPMENT OF UK LAW ON SEPARATE CORPORATE PERSONALITY AND LIMITED LIABILITY

Establishing separate corporate personality and limited liability in the UK
Separate corporate personality, which distinguishes the personality of a company from its shareholders, 17 and limited liability, which prevents shareholders from being liable for the company's debts, 18 were first established in the UK in the 19th century. Before free incorporation by registration was established in 1844, a joint stock company was only able to be established by royal charter or by an Act of Parliament. 19 As Adam Smith appropriately pointed out in his Wealth of Nation, a joint stock company was divergent from 'the general laws' of partnership for the public purpose of promoting some particular manufacturing.
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About 10 years after free incorporation was permitted, general limited liability was introduced by the Limited Liability Act of 1855. 21 The establishment of separate corporate personality in a modern sense was complete by the end of the century. 22 Moreover, it was confirmed that these benefits could be granted not only to large joint stock companies but also to small quasi-partnership companies in Salomon 23 at the end of that century. In Salomon, while the Court of Appeal denied the application of limited liability for the 'one-man' company, emphasising the 'illegitimate purpose' of such a company's formation, the House of Lords reversed the judgment, focusing on the formality of the formation of the company.
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This case had huge impacts not only on the development of corporate theory but also on the 
Transition of the case law on 'veil-lifting'
Corresponding to an increase in social concern about the abuse of separate corporate personality, the courts attempted to fill the gap between the legal appearance as separate entities and the economic reality as a sole entity. For example, in Gilford Motor, 29 the court held that the competitive activity against the former employer by a company controlled by the former employee was in breach of the covenant between the two former employment parties.
Another example is Lipman, 30 where, although the shareholder transferred his land subject to his existing contractual liability to the company he had acquired for this purpose, the court ordered both the shareholder and the company to perform the liability. Meanwhile, the judgment in Knight 31 recognised the parent company's right to be compensated in the compulsory purchase process of the land upon which its subsidiary had conducted business by seeing the subsidiary as an agent of the parent. Davies and Worthington summarise the case law to date related to 'veil-piercing' as follows:
The courts … pierce the corporate veil so as to make the shareholder (corporate or individual) liable on the underlying obligation only where the whole purpose of establishing the corporate structure in the first place was to help perpetrate the relevant fraud.
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In summary, UK case law has acknowledged separate corporate personality and limited liability as basic principles in company law, and has confined the application of 'veilpiercing' to exceptional circumstances. Although the notion of a 'single economic entity' was argued by Lord Denning until the mid-1970s, it was rejected in the subsequent cases based on
Salomon. This tendency against 'veil-piercing' was followed by the Supreme Court in Prest, and it thereby became more difficult to claim 'veil-piercing' in courts.
Case law on direct tortious liability of parent companies
On the other hand, some movements which seemed to encourage 'veil-piercing' in a virtual manner have occurred in the field of the health and safety of employees. whether it is 'fair, just and reasonable' to impose the duty on the party. 51 As a result, she recognised the duty of care of the parent company either to advise its subsidiary about the steps to take or to ensure the implementation of these steps due to the parent's knowledge of the working condition and its superior knowledge about the risks. 52 She summarised her judgment as follows:
[I]n appropriate circumstances the law may impose on a parent company responsibility for the health and safety of its subsidiary's employees. Those circumstances include a situation where, as in the present case, (1) the businesses of the parent and subsidiary are in a relevant respect the same; (2) the parent has, or ought to have, superior knowledge on some relevant aspect of health and safety in the particular industry; (3) the subsidiary's system of work is unsafe as the parent company knew, or ought to have known; and (4) the parent knew or ought to have foreseen that the subsidiary or its employees would rely on its using that superior knowledge for the employees' protection.
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Although her approach could have the same effect as piercing the veil, Arden LJ rejected the view of this approach as 'veil-piercing'.
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In Thompson, the possibility of a direct duty of care owed by the parent company was again recognised with the criteria proposed by Chandler. 55 However, the claim by the employee was rejected due to lack of sufficient evidence. Tomlinson LJ stated that the four factors mentioned by Arden LJ in Chandler were descriptive rather than exhaustive. 56 He then rejected the claim of the plaintiff as there was no basis to confirm that the parent company, which was assumed to be a holding company not conducting any business at the time, had possessed superior knowledge of the risk.
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As seen above, while the scope of 'veil-piercing' has been confined to the exceptional 'evasion' cases in the UK, the direct tortious liability of parent companies was recognised in The justifications for limited liability are generally argued as follows. Despite recognising the weaker justification of limited liability among private companies, Bainbridge still argues that limited liability could be justified for these companies. 60 According to him, limited liability should be a default rule even among private companies because it is difficult to distinguish cases in which unlimited liability applies from those in which limited liability applies. He also argues that, if necessary, the company's creditors can require its shareholders to provide a guarantee for the company's loan.
In contrast, Millon contends that all of the justifications above are insufficient in the case of private companies. 61 He suggests that limited liability among private companies could be justified only if the grant of limited liability is viewed as a 'subsidy' to entrepreneurs and investors. Accordingly, this 'subsidy' would encourage entrepreneurial activities and could resultantly generate larger social benefits, such as jobs, valuable products and services, tax revenues and technological progress. These positive impacts could outweigh the negative impacts of transferring risks from companies to creditors. He also emphasises that, contrary to Bainbridge's assertion, the default rule could affect the result of the bargaining prior to the transaction between the company and its creditor, according to behavioural economics.
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It is arguable that Bainbridge's contention is not sufficiently persuasive. One reason is that the existence of a few indistinguishable cases seems to constitute an insufficient justification to offer limited liability to all private companies. Another reason is that the creditors cannot necessarily bargain with the company and its shareholders equitably, as described below. Thus, as Millon argues, limited liability should be justified in the case of private companies only if the grant thereof is viewed as a beneficial 'subsidy' for entrepreneurship.
Difference between 'Voluntary Creditors' and 'Involuntary Creditors'
Once limited liability is understood as a 'subsidy' for entrepreneurship among private In summary, the type of company and creditor involved in each case should be investigated closely. Although limited liability is less likely to be justified in the case of a private company and a corporate group, the nature of the creditor could also affect the result. 
D. WHEN AND HOW SHOULD LIMITED LIABILITY BE REMOVED?
Categorisation of the situations where limited liability should be removed
As shown in the previous section, the value of limited liability varies depending on the situation. The type of shareholder and creditor, for example, could both affect the value. This section presents a categorisation of the situations in which limited liability should be removed and an investigation into an appropriate legal tool to achieve an appropriate result in each category.
Millon divides the situations in which limited liability should be removed into three categories. 78 The first category is ex ante opportunism. In this situation, the information on which the creditor's assessment and bargaining was based was wrong due to deliberate or reckless disregard by the shareholder. 79 Since the assessment and bargaining were not based on precise information, the cost of risk transfer caused by limited liability could not be reduced. Thus, limited liability should be removed in serious cases, even those involving pure voluntary creditors. A typical example is a fraudulent misrepresentation, namely, an instance in which the company deliberately withheld relevant information.
The second category is ex post opportunism. In this situation, the shareholder has the company transfer its assets to others after the parties have entered the contract. Since this behaviour incurs a loss that the creditor has not accepted, the negative externality of limited liability could exist. Hence, limited liability should be removed in serious cases, even those involving pure voluntary creditors. 80 A typical example can be seen in Lipman. As described in section B, the ownership of the shareholder's land subject to the existing liability was transferred to the company. Elliott is another case related to a corporate group, in which the company's property was transferred to its wholly owned subsidiary.
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The final category is involuntary creditors. Although Millon names this category 'tort creditors', he discusses their involuntariness. 82 As analysed in the previous section, the negative costs of risk transfer caused by limited liability could outweigh the social benefits in this case. potential control. 96 Hence, a parent company could be liable for its subsidiaries' debts unless the parent proves that the opposite party had accepted the express exclusion of the parent from the liability. 97 The legal presumption, however, could only be realised by radical change in legislation or case law. Meanwhile, the same results could be obtained under existing UK law with appropriate inference of facts from the absence of evidential submission by the parent company, if the requirements of a duty of care are interpreted flexibly as shown below.
One possibility is that, if the plaintiff requires the parent company to provide evidence of its insignificance to the relevant decision-making in its subsidiary and the parent does not provide it sufficiently, the parent's involvement can be inferred, taking the uneven distribution of evidence between the parties into account. The Court of Appeal judgment in
Chandler also mentions the 'evidential burden of proof', where, if the plaintiff submits a certain amount of evidence on the involvement of the parent company, the parent has to prove its irrelevance. 98 These methods could induce appropriate results corresponding to the facts in each case.
A more radical proposal is the introduction of 'enterprise liability' suggested by
Muchlinski. 99 He argues that, looking at the economic reality of a corporate group as a single economic entity, 'veil-piercing' should be recognised on the basis of the status of the third party related to the corporate group. 100 As mentioned above, similar legislation was introduced for 'group liability' in Germany, France and the European Community between the 1960s and 1980s. However, there could be strong opposition against this proposal as it is likely to contradict the principle of separate corporate personality by prioritising the economic reality to the legal form. Since this argument is not necessarily confined to involuntary creditors, comprehensive and radical changes in the legal system related to corporate groups would be induced by the general adoption of this regime. Hence, the adoption of 'enterprise liability', which needs the case law change from Adams, is unlikely to occur in the UK for the time being. It is also arguable that the notion of 'enterprise' is too ambiguous to be utilised in practice, 101 that the circumstances related to the creditors cannot be considered in this regime and that the concept of 'relational law' is unfamiliar in the UK. 
E. REFINING CHANDLER'S DIRECT TORTIOUS LIABILITY REGIME
The scope of Chandler's direct tortious liability regime
The previous section confirmed that Chandler' In the Court of Appeal judgment in Chandler, Arden LJ first set out the 'assumption of responsibility', which is required to hold a duty of care for third parties not to harm others, as a criterion to recognise a duty of care. 103 She confirmed that this criterion involves the second and third requirements of the Caparo test, namely 'proximity' and being 'fair, just and reasonable' to impose a duty. The notable point here is that she affirmed that these two requirements were essentially the same question, namely whether a duty of care existed or not. 104 Then, after confirming the unnecessity of the parent's 'absolute control' over the subsidiary, 105 she analysed the facts in the present case. She found a policy in this group which forced the subsidiaries to follow the parent's directions in certain matters, as well as systemic causes of the damage such as the fact that the factory did not have any sidewalls despite the danger of scattering toxic asbestos. 106 Hence the parent's irresponsibility for the actual implementation of health and safety steps in the subsidiary was not held decisive in this case. 107 Subsequently, she held that, given the parent's knowledge of the working conditions and its superior knowledge of the risks of asbestos, the parent had a duty of care either to advise the subsidiary on the reasonable steps to be adopted for safe working conditions or to ensure those steps to be taken. 108 Finally, she summarised her discussion by identifying four factors which were decisive in this case: (1) the same business in a relevant respect; (2) the parent's superior knowledge on the relevant aspect; (3) the parent's knowledge on the subsidiary's working condition; and (4) the subsidiary's reliance on the parent's superior knowledge.
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As Petrin mentions, the notable point in this judgment is the manner in which the three requirements from Caparo were considered. The requirements of 'proximity' and 'fairness' were integrated, and the facts relating to 'foreseeability' were also considered.
Petrin appropriately justifies this approach by stating that there have been many cases, such as Reeman, 110 where the three requirements of a duty of care were considered in an integrated manner.
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Another critical posit in Petrin's article is that the value of limited liability should be considered in the requirement of 'fairness'. 112 This means that the difference in the extent which limited liability can be justified analysed in the previous sections could be considered in the direct tortious liability regime. Such policy consideration by the court is also mentioned by other academics. For example, Muchlinski contends that public policy could affect the notion of the duty of care in serious tort cases, 113 and Deakin et al state that policy consideration by the courts in tort claims is becoming popular.
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With reference to these discussions, the scope of Chandler's direct liability regime could be extended as follows. As mentioned above, Caparo's three requirements should be considered in an integrated manner. Since the requirement of 'fairness' could involve consideration of the value of limited liability, the extent of 'foreseeability' and 'proximity' for the health and safety of the subsidiary's employee. 116 This judgment can be understood as constituting a finding that the misleading information provided by the group before the parties entered into the employment contract prevented the employee from assessing the risks appropriately, rendering the existence of a duty of care fair.
Appropriate understandings of Chandler and Thompson
From this integrated approach of direct tortious liability, Chandler could be understood as follows: since this case involves a health and safety issue between a subsidiary of a corporate group and its employee, the degree of fairness is relatively high. Hence, the levels of foreseeability and proximity required should be relatively low. Given the parent's control over the subsidiary, the parent's knowledge of the working conditions and its superior knowledge of the risks of asbestos, foreseeability and proximity were established in this sense. Thus, it is arguable that this is a distinct case where the parent's duty of care should be upheld.
Meanwhile, in Thompson, the direct duty of care owed by the holding company to the employee of its subsidiary was denied. In this case, although the degree of fairness was as high as in Chandler, there was no evidence of the parent's knowledge and control related to foreseeability and proximity. Hence, the parent's direct duty of care could not be recognised.
Once Chandler's direct tortious liability regime is understood as above, Petrin's criticism against the judgment in Chandler can be rebutted. He argues that, if the requirement of relevant control could be satisfied merely with the parent's voting rights and the existence of group policies, most ordinary corporate groups would suffer from claims from a wide range of third parties. 117 However, the extent of required control will depend on the degree of fairness in each case, so it is unlikely that such a range of claims would succeed. His other criticism is that Chandler's direct tortious liability regime, which does not exclude individual shareholders, would have a chilling effect on entrepreneurship due to the investors' risk to be liable for the company's activities. 118 However, as stated above, most of the individual shareholders will be excluded as a result of the application of this regime, thereby any chilling effect would be insignificant. Although controlling shareholders of small private companies could be directly liable in this regime, this result is appropriate because the degree of fairness is generally high in these cases. 
Rebuttal against possible criticisms
Whilst there are a number of further potential criticisms of the refined direct tortious liability regime, they can be rebutted as follows. Possibly the most frequent criticism will be that the regime would be arbitrary and harm legal certainty. However, this regime can carefully remove arbitrariness as much as possible by putting itself in the existing framework of tort law. In addition, legal certainty and clarity could be improved by the classification of the relevant cases, as will be attempted in the following section, as well as the accumulation of the relevant judgments and discussions.
Another possible criticism is that the courts should not intervene with policy decisions. Although, as shown in section C, the consideration of the value of limited liability inevitably involves a policy decision to some extent, this is acceptable because the courts intervene in policy decisions only to the extent necessary in tort law, which inherently includes certain political goals such as the deterrence of tortious behaviour and justice by compensation. It is also arguable that, as mentioned in section B and section C, limited liability was historically a privilege granted by a state for a certain pubic purpose; thus, there should be policy considerations in judgments on limited liability. If such considerations by the judiciary are deemed inappropriate, the legislature can restrict their ability to do so. Some might also argue that the refined regime is beyond the scope of the existing tort law framework. As shown above, however, it is arguable that the regime can be logically traced back to existing UK case law and legal theories. Finally, some might criticise that the regime would contradict separate corporate personality, which is one of the basic principles of UK 
F. CATEGORISATION OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE THE PARENTS'
DIRECT TORTIOUS LIABILITY COULD BE RECOGNISED
Four categories where the parents' direct tortious liability could be recognised
Consideration of prior cases allows for an argument to be made regarding the existence of four categories in which the parents' direct tortious liability could be recognised. Although this categorisation is not exhaustive, it could significantly improve the legal certainty and clarity of this regime.
a) Reliance on superior knowledge
The first category is reliance on superior knowledge. This category mainly includes physical torts which cannot be prevented without relevant scientific knowledge such as certain types of industrial accidents, product liabilities and environmental problems. Chandler and
Thompson, where up-to-date scientific knowledge about the risk of asbestos was crucial to preventing the harm, could be included in this category. The parent company could be liable when it has superior knowledge about the risk upon which its subsidiary relied on, or could reasonably be expected to rely on, but does not utilise that knowledge to prevent possible harms. Since the victims are generally involuntary creditors, the high degree of fairness could lower the requirements for foreseeability and proximity. In addition, the parent's superior knowledge and the subsidiary's reliance on it could constitute a high level of proximity.
Hence, it is likely that the parent's direct tortious liability is recognised even if the degree of control was not very strong.
The subsidiary's reliance could be established from relevant facts such as the degree of the parent's involvement in the subsidiary's business, the method of management of health and safety issues in the group and the degree of uneven distribution of relevant knowledge and experts within the group. For example, if the parent company has formulated the group's health and safety policy to be carried out by its subsidiaries and the policy failed to prevent the harm, the parent is likely to be directly liable. Another example is the situation where the parent company has formed a business model based on its superior knowledge, its subsidiaries carry out day-to-day operations and the risk is inherent in the business model.
Arden LJ in Chandler appropriately mentions these situations as a 'systemic risk'.
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The latest case in this category is Lungowe, 123 where water contamination by the subsidiary's copper mine injured the neighbouring residents. 124 The Hon. Mr Justice Coulson mentioned the following factors which could support the parent's direct liability: the report issued by the parent, a holding company, suggested the existence of governance framework formulated by the parent to prevent water contamination; the agreement between the parent and the subsidiary suggested that the parent provided relevant services including project development and management; employees of the parent and other group companies played an important role in the business; and the parent had significant control over the subsidiary.
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Although the judgment did not directly mention the parent's superior knowledge, the involvement of the parent in the subsidiary's business could suggest the parent's superior knowledge about the contamination risk and the subsidiary's reliance on that knowledge.
b) Confusing representation
The second category is confusing representation. It mainly includes economic torts, although it also includes physical torts preceded by a contract such as product liability and industrial accidents. In this category, the party who entered the transaction with the subsidiary confused the opposite party as its parent or the group itself at that time due to a confusing manner of representation. Although some cases in this category could also be dealt with through traditional misrepresentation law, the direct tortious liability regime could satisfy certain creditors who cannot be compensated in the traditional framework.
A typical example is ArmorGroup, where, as mentioned above, although the name of the employer, the subsidiary, on the employment contract document was correct, the names of its parent and the group were used in a confusing manner in the course of recruitment.
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Another possible example is the situation where the name of the parent or the group itself were disproportionately emphasised to evoke a sense of security to the opposite party, which can frequently be seen particularly in invitations to potential employees and individual consumers. In this category, the degree of fairness could be high because the opposite party did not have sufficient information to assess the risk of the transaction, thereby the demands for the other two requirements, foreseeability and proximity, could be lower. In VTB, although the individual controller of the company was held liable for the misrepresentation of the company ownership, 127 he would also have direct tortious liability if he gave the correct information in a confusing manner.
c) Business integration
The third category is business integration. Although this category can include both physical and economic torts and could overlap the former two categories, the parent's direct tortious liability is more likely to be affirmed even if the degree of fairness is not very high. Most undercapitalisation cases could be included in this category. For example, if the parent company intervenes in the subsidiary's financial decision-making and siphons profits from the subsidiary, the parent could be liable to the subsidiary's creditors in the event of the subsidiary's bankruptcy even if neither 'veil-piercing' nor protection under the Insolvency Act 1986 cannot be applied. In cases where an existing corporate structure was abused, which could fall out of the scope of 'veil-piercing' as mentioned in section D, it is useful for the creditors to claim the shareholder's direct tortious liability.
Another typical example is the circumstance where a subsidiary is just a part of the group business controlled by the parent. If the parent has set up the whole business and the business has a 'systemic' risk, the parent could be directly liable even if the parent did not directly involve the business. The direct tortious liability regime could have applied in
Kensington,
128 where 'veil-piercing' was affirmed mainly because the whole group was integrated for a single business. Adams could also be included in this category because the worldwide production and sales of asbestos governed by the parent company seemed to involve some 'systemic' problems, such as not warning of the possible dangers. [W]here decision-making is so centralised that major policies could not have been formulated or put into operation without the direct involvement of the parent company, … the parent is likely to be aware, or ought to be aware, of the risk to potential claimants of such group actions, and to be sufficiently proximate to hold a duty of care towards them.
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One significant difference between this category and the first category (reliance on superior knowledge), is that the latter category could include cases where businesses of the parent and its subsidiary are completely different. A parent which produces steel and its subsidiary which runs construction business is such an example. If the parent knows the possible danger inherent in a certain type of steel and the subsidiary does not have enough resources to determine the danger, the parent could be responsible for utilising its superior knowledge to prevent accidents related to the subsidiary's business. Another possible example is a holding company which does not run any business, but has superior knowledge and significant control over its subsidiary as to the relevant issue.
d) Fairness for other reasons
The final category is fairness for other reasons, where, instead of a weak justification for limited liability, there are some other factors which could cause a high degree of fairness. For example, when a shareholder obtained profits by utilising the company in an illegal manner, it is certainly unfair and unjust to grant the shareholder the benefit of limited liability.
Therefore, claims from the company's creditors against the shareholder should be broadly affirmed. cases. 147 These results evidently correspond to the categorisation attempted in this section.
In the UK, Mitchell investigates 290 cases prior to 1998, although he does not analyse the reasons why 'veil-piercing' was affirmed. 148 In terms of the shareholdings of company, he demonstrates that 'veil-lifting' is the least likely to occur in the case of subsidiaries (40.00%
of cases) compared to that of companies closely controlled by human shareholders (54.31%
of cases) and even that of companies which have dispersed ownership by human shareholders (48.33% of cases). 149 As to the type of claim, 'veil-lifting' is less likely to occur in the case of tortious liability (27.78% of cases) than that of contractual liability (42.86% of cases).
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Similar tendencies can also be seen in the US according to the observations of Matheson and
Thompson.
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The findings that 'veil-piercing' is more likely to occur in cases involving closely controlled companies as opposed to dispersed-ownership companies are supported by the discussion on the justification of limited liability presented above. On the other hand, the findings that 'veil-piercing' is less likely to occur in cases involving corporate shareholders and tort creditors than in those involving either individual shareholders or contractual creditors apparently contradict the discussion above. However, this apparent contradiction could be resolved with reference to the facts that: (1) in the case of individual shareholders and contractual creditors, it is more likely that shareholders' opportunism occurs, which could easily induce 'veil-piercing'; (2) there could be a selection bias in the cases involving corporate shareholders and tort creditors because they are more likely to be published due to social attention; and (3) in these cases the parties are more likely to refuse the settlement and demand the judgment for their emotional satisfaction. In the near future, it is anticipated that the accumulation of relevant judgments and discussion will further establish the legal certainty of this regime. It is also anticipated that practical attempts in the manner in which rules of evidence are formed and applied, including appropriate inference of facts, will be made to overcome the difficulties in operating this regime, such as the uneven distribution of relevant evidence. Through these efforts, the refined direct tortious liability regime is expected to supplement 'veil-piercing' to a significant extent.
